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Despite the prevalence of horizontal mergers no uni￿ed model has yet emerged
that satisfactorily explains such mergers. Ravenscraft and Scherer (1987)
mention several merger motivations that are not mutually exclusive and can
be more or less relevant in individual cases. For example, a temporary over-
valuation of own stock or an undervaluation of the target ￿rm might make
acquisitions attractive. A second set of motivations can be summarized as
￿synergies￿. Such synergies may include complementarities in production or
marketing, economies of scale, improvements in risk characteristics or ￿nan-
cial constraints, or tax advantages. A third set of motives include asymmetric
competence or a perception of superior own competence on the side of the
management of the acquiring ￿rm, and empire building motives. Finally, the
eﬀects of merger and acquisition on market concentration and market power
considerations play a major role.1
A large theoretical literature on the pro￿tability of merger has emerged
that focusses on the market concentration aspect, and this aspect is also
central for the concerns of the anti-trust authorities. This theory suggests
that market power considerations do not constitute a strong motivation for
merger. In a linear Cournot market, for example, two ￿rms never have an
incentive to merge (see Salant, Switzer, and Reynolds 1983) unless the merger
leads to a monopoly. While this strong result is weakened for other types of
competition, or for synergies (see, e.g., Perry and Porter 1985 who consider
convex cost), there is a general tendency for ￿rms not involved in a merger to
bene￿t more from the merger than the two merging ￿rms (see, e.g., Deneckere
and Davidson 1985 for the Bertrand case).
We study this pro￿tability eﬀect of changes in market power and market
shares when ￿rms compete in international markets. More speci￿cally, we
analyse the pro￿tability eﬀect in export oriented industries with high market
1Market power considerations were important in early merger waves, e.g., around 1900
(see, e.g., Caves, Fortunato and Ghemawat 1984), and may also play a role in the more
recent merger wave where a large share of the mergers were horizontal.
1concentration where there is strategic trade policy. In this international setup
it will be important to distinguish between national merger and acquisition
and cross-border merger and acquisition. National and cross-border mergers
have very diﬀerent pro￿tability eﬀects both for the ￿rms involved in the
merger and for their competitors in the diﬀerent countries. We show that
the strategic trade policy aspect can make pro￿table a national merger that
would be unpro￿table in a laissez-faire economy. International acquisition
is shown to be less pro￿table. We also determine the equilibrium industry
structure that emerges from endogenous acquisition decisions.
The mechanism that drives our results can be easily illustrated for a
Cournot industry with three ￿rms, A, B and M. A is located in country 1,B
and M are located in a diﬀerent country 2. In the absence of strategic trade
policy, the merger between B and M changes the market from a triopoly to a
duopoly. Under free trade, the merger of B and M is unlikely to increase their
joint pro￿ts and is likely to bene￿t ￿rm A that is not involved in the merger.
If country 1 uses strategic trade policy, e.g., via export subsidies to ￿rm A
that are observed by the competitors, the competitors, B and M, will reduce
competitive eﬀorts (Brander and Spencer 1985). The situation is diﬀerent
in country 2, where two ￿rms are located. If country 2 subsidizes ￿rm B, it
will induce a reaction not only by A, but also by M. Similarly, if country 1
subsidizes ￿rm M, it will induce a reaction not only by A, but also by B. If it
subsidizes both ￿r m s ,t h e s en e g a t i v es i d ee ﬀects (or ￿cannibalization￿ eﬀects)
do not cancel out, they add up. Accordingly, in the pre-merger situation,
the fact that B and M are both located in country 2 puts country 2 in a
disadvantageous position. The merger removes this disadvantage. After the
merger we would expect an increase in country 2￿s strategic trade policy
activities, and, as an equilibrium eﬀect, a reduction in country 1￿s strategic
trade activities.
The question addressed here has many links with the existing literature
on trade and merger. Optimal trade policy can be understood as a country￿s
attempt to generate coordination of its exporting ￿rms in order to maxi-
mize national welfare. Therefore, trade policy and merger policy are closely
2linked. This link has been highlighted in a number of papers. A paper that
is closely related to our analysis is Dixit (1984). He considers the strategic
trade policy of two countries that host several ￿rms in the same industry
and compete in both countries￿ markets. His comparative static analysis
of changes in the number of ￿rms addresses issues of welfare and overall
pro￿tability of merger. However, he does not disentangle the pro￿tability
eﬀects for the merging ￿rms and non-merging ￿rms in the same country
and in other countries, or the diﬀerence between national and international
merger. He also does not address the issue of endogenous merger. Head
and Ries (1997) consider national incentives to block national mergers in
an international context. Cowan (1989) considers competition policy and
strategic trade policy with one importing country and one exporting coun-
try. Richardson (1999) shows that ￿slack competition policy￿ is a substitute
for trade restrictions: tariﬀs act as a coordination device that can change
the behavior of a country￿s competitive industry towards behaving like a col-
luding group of suppliers who use their market power. Horn and Levinsohn
(2001) consider the government￿s choice between strategic trade policy and
competition policy more closely. They consider governments which choose
market concentration and trade subsidies in their own country. They show
that the timing of the choice of market concentration and trade subsidies is
important. A similar welfare analysis is pursued in Rysman (2001)i nw h i c h
governments that maximize national welfare ￿rst choose competition policy
(the number of ￿rms) and then choose strategic trade subsidies.
In these analyses both competition policy (or the choice of market con-
centration) and trade policy, are typically decision variables in the hands of
governments and the focal question is how they are related to each other.
Moreover, governments only control the number of ￿r m si nt h e i ro w nc o u n -
try. International merger and acquisition is not considered. In our framework
￿rms ￿ not governments ￿ make merger decisions, and thereby aﬀect gov-
ernments￿ future decisions about strategic trade policy. Pro￿t and not welfare
i st h eo b j e c t i v ef u n c t i o no ft h ed e c i s i o nm a k e r si nt h e￿rst stage. With this
setup we study how the involvement of governments via strategic trade policy
3aﬀects the standard results on merger pro￿tablility. National and interna-
tional merger often have opposite pro￿tability eﬀects. Strategic trade policy
generates results for national merger that turn the standard results on the
concentration eﬀects of merger upside down,2 whereas international mergers
remain unpro￿table.
Our interest in the analysis of merger in export oriented markets with
strategic trade policy has been stimulated by a few recent merger cases in
oligopolistic export industries in which strategic trade policy is empirically
an important element. Three examples are: the competition among air-
craft producers where recently a merger between two main producers in the
US (Boeing and McDonnell-Douglas) reduced the market from triopoly to a
duopoly (Boeing and Airbus). A second example is the highly concentrated
market for aircraft engines in which a merger between two major producers
in the US (Honeywell and General Electric) was discussed. A third example
is the competition in the production of tanks between the US and Germany
in the eighties. In all three cases there is a clear perception that strategic
trade policy plays a major role.3 We do not provide case studies of these
industries here. Instead, we highlight a more general eﬀe c tt h a tm a k e sn a -
tional merger bene￿cial (both for merging ￿rms and for countries in which
2A literature that is closely related to our analysis considers the fact that there are
strategic interactions not only in the output market. Lommerud, Straume and Słrgard
(2001), for instance, consider the role of input markets with imperfect competition, par-
ticularly unionized labor markets, and show that these can make merger more pro￿table.
Ziss (2001) and Gonzales-Maestre and Lopez-Cunat (2001) consider the pro￿tability of
merger when shareholders strategically delegate their output decisions to managers, mak-
ing their objective function a weighted average of pro￿ts and sales. This diﬀers from a
sales subsidy that turns out to have stronger eﬀects. The strategic trade eﬀect and the
delegation eﬀect could also be present simultaneously, in which case we expect that the
two eﬀects would add up.
3For instance, hidden subsidies are a perpetual matter of much debate between the
major aircraft manufacturers, and the two countries in which they are located, both sides
claiming that the competitor ￿rm is highly subsidized, for instance, through defense con-
tracts or preferential governmental loans. See, e.g., Wirtschaftswoche no. 21,M a y17,
2001,p .7 0 .
4this merger occurs) that is relevant in all export oriented oligopoly markets
in which strategic trade policy is used.
In the analysis here we focus on Cournot competition4 but similar results
also hold under diﬀerent forms of competition.5 In Section 2 we introduce
the Cournot model for the simple two-country case that is generalized in
Section 3. In Section 4 we consider endogenous merger decisions and Section
5 concludes.
2 Cournot competition with two countries and
three ￿rms
Consider the merger problem as in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) in
the context of strategic trade policy as in Brander and Spencer (1985). Let
us start the analysis by looking at the special case that was used in the
introduction: a Cournot industry with three ￿rms, A,B and M. A is located
in country 1, while B and M are located in a diﬀerent country 2.
The ￿rms are owned by inhabitants of the country in which they are
located.6 They produce a homogenous good and compete in a standard
Cournot game. Each ￿rm chooses its quantity xi (i = A,B,M) simultane-
4The Cournot framework can also be seen a shortcut to competition by capacity choice
with subsequent price competition as in Kreps and Scheinkman (1983).
5In an earlier version of this paper we present a full analysis of strategic trade policy and
national and international merger if the market interaction is described by promotional
competition (see Huck and Konrad 2001).
6This assumes away the possibility of internationally dispersed share ownership, where
the pro￿ts of a ￿r ml o c a t e di nc o u n t r yi are part of country j￿s welfare. The assumption is
in line with empirically well documented strong home country biases in portfolio compo-
sition (see, e.g., Adler and Dumas, 1983, and French and Poterba 1991). The assumption
also ￿ts with the Boeing-Airbus example, and in Huck and Konrad (2003) we show why
there is a tendency for a home bias in ownership structure, particularly in a strategic
trade policy context. International dispersion of shareholdings changes the strategic envi-
ronment. A paper that has highlighted this fact in a diﬀerent context is Barros and Cabral
(1994).
5ously with all other ￿rms. They sell their products exclusively in a market in
a third country. This assumption has been carefully discussed in the strategic
trade literature and is purely for simplicity.7
Before the ￿rms choose their quantities, both countries, 1 and 2, decide
about subsidizing the sales of the home ￿rms by a per-unit subsidy. We limit
consideration to cases where ￿rms in the same country have to receive the
same per-unit subsidy, denoted sj for country j.8 All three ￿rms observe
the subsidy choices in the two countries before they choose their quantities.
Demand for the homogenous good is downward sloping and linear and can,
thus, be normalized to
p(X)=1− X,( 1)
where X ≡ xA + xB + xM. We also follow Salant, Switzer and Reynolds
(1983) and assume that all ￿rms have the same constant cost c per unit of
output, and that this cost is not changed if a merger occurs.
In a completely unregulated world economy the Cournot equilibrium en-
tails xi = 1−c
4 . Given the subsidies (s1,s 2),t h e3-player Cournot subgame
for given subsidies has a diﬀerent solution. Using (9), ￿rm i￿s pro￿tt h a ti s
l o c a t e di nc o u n t r yj c a nb ew r i t t e na s
Πi = xi(1 − X − c + s
j). (2)
Welfare in country 1 is ￿rm A￿s revenue net of production cost,
W1 = xA(p(X) − c) (3)
while welfare in country 2 is the combined revenue from ￿rms B and M net
of their combined production cost,
W2 =( xB + xM)(p(X) − c). (4)
7Brander and Spencer (1985) make this assumption to remove considerations of con-
sumer rent from the picture so as to single out and highlight the strategic interaction of
￿rms. Consumer rents in the exporting countries are considered in a broader analysis in
which the results derived here remain relevant.
8While this non-discrimination provision is a plausible assumption (especially from a
legal point of view), it is not clear ap r i o r iwhether it restricts the generality of the results.
Countries may want to pursue asymmetric strategies.
6In both cases, subsidy payments net out in the equation determining a coun-
try￿s welfare: they reduce government revenue and increase ￿rm pro￿ts.
For given subsidies, s1 and s2, the equilibrium quantity for ￿rm A in
country 1 as the solution of the two-stage game for ￿rms A and for ￿rms B
and M is given by x∗
A = 1
4(1 − c +3 s1 − 2s2) and x∗
B = x∗
M = 1
4(1 − c − s1 +
2s2), respectively, yielding an equilibrium price of p = 1
4(1 + 3c − s1 − 2s2).
Substituting into (3) and (4) we can write country 1￿s ￿rst-order condition
as s1 = 1
3 − 1
3c− 2
3s2 and s2 =0 . Hence, in equilibrium s1∗ = 1−c
3 and s2∗ =0 .
Thus, the ￿cannibalizing￿ eﬀect of subsidies in countries with more than
one ￿rm reduces this country￿s incentives to subsidize its ￿rms. In this exam-

















Consider now a national merger in country 2. A merger in the framework
of Salant, Switzer and Reynolds who assume constant unit cost is basically
equivalent to one of the merging ￿rms disappearing or being closed down.
Intuitively, if one of the two ￿rms, B and M, disappears due to the merger,
country 2￿s incentives to use strategic trade policy should be resurrected. If B
and M merge and, hence, there is only one ￿rm left in country 2, this becomes
the duopoly case considered by Brander and Spencer (1985). Equilibrium
subsidies are s1 = s2 = 1−c
5 . This yields pro￿ts9





9The pro￿to ft h em e r g e d￿rms is simply the market pro￿t earned by the ￿rm that is the
result of the merger. We do not discuss pricing of ownership shares and monetary transfers
if one ￿rm acquires the other, as this transfer between the owners of the pre-merger ￿rms
nets out when considering the total pro￿ts of the ￿rm generated by the merger.
7and welfare in both countries is given by





A comparison of (5) and (6) with (7) and (8) shows that the merger of B
and M in country 2 is pro￿table, welfare in country 2 increases, the pro￿to f
￿rm A in country 1 falls, and welfare in country 1 is reduced. These results
are in sharp contrast to the eﬀects of a merger in a laissez-faire economy
where a national merger harms the ￿rms involved and, thus, the country
they are located in, while foreign ￿rms and countries gain. This illustrates
the importance of the strategic trade eﬀect on mergers.
Consider also an international merger in this example. Let ￿rm A in coun-
try 1 merge with ￿rm M in country 2. Applying the same logic as before, this
is equivalent to one of the ￿rms disappearing. For international mergers we
have to distinguish which of the two merging ￿rms ￿disappears￿. We will say
￿A acquires M￿,i f￿rm M is closed down after the merger, and vice versa.
We also need to discuss share ownership in the case of international merger.
For the national merger of ￿rms owned by individuals from the same country,
the ￿rm that exists after the merger is still nationally owned. For interna-
tional acquisitions, many cases and issues could be addressed but are left out
of the picture here.10 Instead, we isolate the repercussions of international
mergers on strategic trade policy. For this purpose the acquiring company
buys the shares of the acquired ￿rm, which automatically leads to indigenised
ownership, also of the ￿rm that made the acquisition.11 Alternatively, this
new ownership structure could be the result of an acquisition that is paid for
10For instance, the international ownership structure of the merged entity could depend
on whether the owners of the acquired ￿rm are paid with stock or with cash; tax treatment
of the new entity; tax arbitrage through pro￿t shifting and transfer pricing; the use of
foreign direct investment as an instrument for tariﬀ jumping; eﬀects on bargaining power
vis-a-vis local unions, or vis-a-vis national governments.
11The joint pro￿t earned by the ￿rm after acquisition in the market must then also pay
for the price paid for the acquired ￿rm. As in Salant, Switzer and Reynolds, we do not
discuss the problem of determining this price, but rather consider whether the market
pro￿t of the joint entity increases or decreases compared to their independent pro￿ts. If
pro￿ts earned in the product market reduce (as it happens in this example), such merger
8by an equity swap and further transactions in the stock market by which the
after-merger ￿rm is fully indigenised in the end. Full indigenisation of the
￿rm after merger or acquisition is clearly a special case, but a particularly
important one, as there is a tendency for ￿rms to indigenise in a world with
strategic trade policy.12
For illustration, consider now A acquiring M. The new industry structure
is again described by a symmetric duopoly of indigenised ￿rms. We therefore
can use the results in (5) and (7). Compared to the triopoly situation, the





situation without acquisition to 4




25(1 − c)2. Accordingly, the company that emerges from A
acquiring M makes lower pro￿ts in the market than A alone makes without
the acquisition. Hence, even if the takeover price were zero, A would not
want to make this acquisition.
How these eﬀects generalize in a ￿larger￿ world with arbitrarily many
countries and ￿rms is shown in the next section, in which we can also consider
the impact on ￿rms in countries in which neither an acquiring ￿rm nor an
acquired ￿rm is located.
3T h e g e n e r a l m o d e l
We make the same general assumptions about production, timing and welfare
as above but now consider n ￿rms, located in k countries. The set of ￿rms
is denoted by N a n dt h es e to fc o u n t r i e sb yK.T h es e to f￿rms in country
j is denoted by Nj and nj is the number of ￿rms in country j.A c c o r d i n g l y ,
is typically not taking place. The willingness to pay on the side of the acquirer would be
negative, the asking price on the side of the owners of the acquired ￿rm would be strictly
positive.
12There are more general results suggesting that international ownership is a disadvan-
tage in a strategic trade context. Huck and Konrad (2003) survey some of the literature
and in a strategic trade context show that ￿rm value is increased by indigenisation if other
￿rms are indigenised.
9S
j∈K Nj = N and
P
j∈K nj = n. Demand is again normalized to
p(X)=1− X,( 9 )
where X ≡
P
i∈N xj and all ￿rms are assumed to have the same constant
cost c per unit of output. In an unregulated world economy the Cournot
equilibrium implies xi = 1−c
n+1.
Firm i￿s pro￿tt h a ti sl o c a t e di nc o u n t r yj c a nb ew r i t t e na s
Πi = xi(1 − X − c + sj) (10)
while welfare in country j i sd e s c r i b e db yt h es u mo ft h er e v e n u e so ft h e




(p(X) − c)xi.( 11)
We look only for subgame perfect equilibria of the two-stage game of
Cournot oligopoly in a strategic trade environment. Sometimes we will use
as u p e r s c r i p ti with the subsidy variable; si signi￿es the subsidy which ￿rm
i receives. As all ￿rms in a country receive the same subsidy, si = sr = sj





For given trade subsidies, ￿rm i￿s best-response function can be written
implicitly as
xi − s
i =1− X − c. (12)
Taking the sum of all left-hand and all right-hand sides of (12) we obtain the
total quantity X as a function of the ￿total subsidies￿ S. Substituting into



























i − sj). (15)
This describes the Cournot outcome for given subsidies.
We now turn to the strategic trade policy game in which each country
maximizes (15) by a choice of sj.C o u n t r y j￿s best response function is






























Using symmetry of ￿rms within the same country, the resulting ￿rst-order






with i ∈ Nj.
Substituting x∗
i by (13) the ￿rst-order condition can be rewritten as




Summing both sides of (16) over countries gives





S =( 1− c)
k(n +1 )− 2n
k(n +1 )− n +1
.( 17)
Inserting (17) into (16) and re-arranging gives the equilibrium subsidies as
s
∗
j =( 1− c)
(n +1− 2nj)
(kn+ k − n +1 )nj
.( 18)
Hence, by (13) and (14)￿rm i in country j supplies
x
∗
i =( 1− c)
n − nj +1








n − nj +1
(kn+ k − n +1 )nj
‚2
. (20)
Accordingly, we can compute country j￿s welfare as
W
∗
j =( 1− c)
2 n − nj +1
(kn+ k − n +1 )
2. (21)
These results can be used to determine the consequences of a merger
for ￿rm pro￿ts and the welfare of the countries. We consider the merger
of m ￿rms. When stating our results we distinguish between ￿rms that are
involved in the merger, their competitors in the same country, and their
competitors in other countries. First we consider mergers between m ￿rms
in the same country.
Proposition 1 (i) A merger of m ￿rms within country j is never pro￿table
for ￿rms in country r 6= j. (ii) A merger in country j is always pro￿table for
competitors in the same country. (iii) A merger is pro￿t a b l ef o rt h eg r o u po f
merging ￿rms in country j if
nj < (m +
√
m)
(k − 1)(n − m)+2 k




(iv) A merger of m ￿rms in country j is always more pro￿table for competi-
tors in country j than for the merging ￿rms in this country.
F o rap r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 we compare the respective pro￿ts (20). This
is straightforward for (i)-(iii). Property (iv) follows from symmetry of ￿rms
within a country ex ante and ex post and from the fact that the merging
￿rms￿ share in pro￿ts accruing to the ￿rms in country j drops from m/nj to
1/(nj − m +1 ) , whereas the share in pro￿ts accruing to a ￿rm not involved
in this merger increases from 1/nj to 1/(nj − m +1 ) .
The inequality in (iii) in Proposition 1 which determines whether the
merger is pro￿table or not, merits some attention. In general, it says that
the number of ￿rms in the country in which the merger takes place must not














Figure 1:C r i t i c a lnj for pro￿tability of m =2as a function of k and n.
decreases in the number of countries. Thus, a merger of two ￿rms is rather
pro￿table in an industry where there are many ￿rms in a few countries than
the other way round. Figure 1 plots the critical nj (number of ￿rms in
the country where the merger takes place) for the case of a bilateral merger
(m =2 ). It can be seen that bilateral mergers are rarely pro￿table if there
are initially more than 5 ￿rms in the country in which the merger is planned
because the reduction of the cannibalization eﬀect is too small.
Next we consider international merger. As discussed in section 2, in a
market environment as above, the impact of an international merger depends
on post-merger ownership structure, but there is a tendency for indigenisation
of the company that emerges after an acquisition. We consider this case here.
Hence, an acquisition of a ￿rm in another country r by a ￿rm in country j can
be seen as the closing down of the acquired ￿rm in country r. Taking this into
account we can again use (20) and calculate the bene￿to fa ni n t e r n a t i o n a l
acquisition and compare it to national mergers. We ￿nd
Proposition 2 Suppose a ￿rm i in country j acquires a set Mr of mr <n r
￿rms in country r (r 6= j) and ownership of the merged entity is with residents
in country j. (i) This merger is pro￿table for the ￿rms in the set Nr\Mr (i.e.,
the ￿rms in country r that are not acquired). (ii) This merger is not pro￿table
14for non-merging ￿rms in country j (Nj \{i}) and even less pro￿table for the
group of merging ￿rms (Mr ∪ {i}).
F o rap r o o fo fp r o p e r t y(i) we con￿rm
[(1 − c)
n − ni +1
(kn+ k − n +1 )ni
]
2 < [(1 − c)
(n − mi) − (ni − mi)+1
(kn+ k − (n − mi)+1 )( ni − mi)
]
2.
For property (ii) we con￿rm
[(1 − c)
n − nj +1
(kn+ k − n +1 )nj
]
2 > [(1 − c)
(n − mi) − nj +1
(k(n − mi)+k − (n − mi)+1 )nj
]
2.
Finally, consider the acquisition of the set of ￿rms Mr by a ￿rm i in
country j. The merged entity receives the same pro￿ta sa n y￿rm in country
j post acquisition. Prior to the acquisition, however, the joint pro￿ts of i
and the ￿rms in Mr were equal to the pro￿to f￿rm i (that is identical to
the pro￿t of any of the other ￿rms in country j) plus the pro￿to ft h e￿rms
in Mr. Hence, in addition to the loss incurred by any ￿rm in the acquiring
￿rm￿s country as in (ii), the merging ￿rms lose the pre-merger pro￿to ft h e
￿rms in Mr.
We can summarize the results in Propositions 1 a n d2 .W ec o n s i d e r e dt h e
pro￿tability of national and cross-border ￿rm acquisitions in linear Cournot
markets in which an acquisition of a ￿rm is equivalent to buying a competi-
tor and closing it down. In the free-trade situation, it is never pro￿table to
acquire a ￿rm (and essentially close it down) if more than one ￿rm remains.
But with strategic trade policy, buying another national ￿rm (and closing it
down) can be a pro￿t-enhancing strategy for the acquiring ￿rm. In contrast,
buying up ￿rms that operate in other countries is never a pro￿table strategy
as long as more than one ￿rm remains world wide. Hence, our results reverse
the pro￿tability results by Salant, Switzer and Reynolds (1983) for national
mergers, whereas, for international mergers, their results are remain qualita-
tively intact in the presence of strategic trade. Although pro￿tability drives
merger decisions, it is interesting to consider brie￿y welfare as well.
Proposition 3 A national merger of m ￿rms in country j is always bene￿-
cial for country j. It can be harmful for other countries.
1The proof of the ￿rst part of Proposition 3 follows from comparing the
respective equilibrium welfare levels as described by (21). The second part
is shown by the example in the previous section. It was shown there for two
countries with one ￿rm A in country 1 and two ￿rms B and M in country
2 that the merger between B and M reduced national welfare in country 1
from W1 =
(1−c)2
12 to W1 = 2
25(1 − c)2. ⁄
The intuition for Proposition 3 can be developed as follows. If ￿rms merge
in country 2, this country can use strategic trade policy more eﬃciently and
will make more use of it. Hence, for unchanged trade subsidies in other
countries, this direct eﬀect will increase the output of this country￿s ￿rms
and will harm the ￿rms in other countries. The welfare bene￿to ft h i se ﬀect
is typically smaller than the resulting pro￿t increase, but typically goes in
the same direction. Further, anticipating country 2￿s behavior, the other
country 1 will typically use strategic trade policy less aggressively. This
further bene￿ts the ￿rm(s) in country 2 and country 2￿s welfare.
A further result can be stated for aggregate welfare. World welfare is





j determined in (19) and using that
Pk
j=1 nj = n yields
p
∗ =1− (1 − c)
kn− n + k
kn+ k − n +1
.( 2 3 )
The equilibrium price is, hence, monotonically decreasing in n,r e a c h i n gp = c
for n →∞ . Any merger therefore increases aggregate welfare among the
group of exporting countries and reduces world welfare.
4 Endogenising merger
Horn and Persson (2001a) point out that the pro￿tability of a particular
merger between two ￿r m si sn o ts u ﬃcient to explain whether or not the
merger takes place. If two ￿rms do not merge, others may, and, as we have
seen in the previous sections, the bene￿t of a merger between two ￿rms in
15a country may be higher for non-merging ￿r m si nt h i sc o u n t r yt h a nf o rt h e
￿rms that are actually involved in the merger, and this could induce a waiting
game.
Several suggestions have been made to endogenise the merger decision,
surveyed in Horn and Persson (2001a).13 They also suggest a framework
for studying endogenous merger and apply it in an international framework
in which ￿rms use foreign direct investment as a means of tariﬀ jumping
in Horn and Persson (2001b). In their approach ￿rm owners determine the
market structure fully cooperatively, allowing for binding agreements and
side payments. Once the ￿rm structure has been chosen, ￿rms interact fully
non-cooperatively in the product market. If the merger outcome is the result
of eﬃcient bargaining with side payments, the problem that merger generates
a positive externality to other ￿rms can be solved.
We apply this approach to determine the endogenous industry structures
in a strategic trade policy environment. Two cases must be distinguished.
I no n ec a s ea l l￿rms in all countries can negotiate. In a second case, eﬃcient
negotiations take place only among ￿rms within one country, simultaneously
in all countries. The ￿rst case has a trivial solution with or without strategic
trade policy: a cooperative outcome has precisely one ￿rm (n =1 )s e r v i n g
the whole world market as a monopolist (receiving zero subsidies from the
government). This follows immediately from the fact that the monopoly
maximizes the total industry rent and that negotiations cannot stop prior to
reaching this outcome.
Consider the more interesting case in which ￿rms can negotiate only na-
tionally. Here, in principle, the concentration process could come to a stop
prior to reaching national monopolies. We ￿nd, however,
Proposition 4 If ￿rms can merge and bargain eﬃciently only within coun-
13A further recent contribution is by Wey (2001). He assumes that a takeover target
is determined exogenously whereupon all other ￿rms in the industry make takeover bids
as in a standard auction. The interesting aspect that mirrors the merger problem in the
Cournot game in Section 2 of this paper is that all ￿rms prefer that the take-over takes
place, but prefer if one of the other ￿rms is acquiring the target.
16tries then an industry structure with one ￿rm in each country is the unique
equilibrium outcome.
For a proof we show that national monopolization is a dominant strategy
for ￿rms in country j.T h es u mo f￿rm pro￿ts in country j in the Cournot





((k − 1)n−j +( k − 1)nj + k +1 )√nj
‚2
.
This term is strictly decreasing in nj and reaches a maximum for nj ≥ 1 at
nj =1 . ⁄
5 Conclusions
In this paper we consider the pro￿tability of merger in an international con-
text in which governments use strategic trade policy and the equilibrium
outcome if merger is endogenous. The analysis is stimulated by the takeover
of McDonnell-Douglas by Boeing and other recent takeover attempts among
￿rms which compete for high-tech products in international markets, and in
which strategic trade policy is a particularly relevant aspect.
We show that strategic trade policy can be a key explanation for why
mergers between ￿rms in the same country occur: the anticipated change in
strategic trade policy increases the pro￿tability of merger within a country.
The same does not hold for international mergers which are not rendered
more pro￿table by strategic trade policy. With strategic trade policy, the
merger of two ￿rms in one country increases this country￿s incentives to use
strategic trade policy. The country in which the merger occurred chooses
higher trade subsidies and the country in which no merger occurred chooses
lower trade subsidies. This leads to the following results: (i) ￿rms involved
in the merger can bene￿t from the merger. (ii) merger among ￿rms within a
country can harm competitors in other countries. (iii) merger of ￿rms within
17a country can increase national welfare in this country and reduce welfare in
other countries.
In contrast, international acquisitions are not pro￿table for the acquiring
￿rm and the target, they harm competitors in the acquiring ￿rm￿s home
country and bene￿tt h e￿rms in the home country of the acquired ￿rm, much
like in the absence of strategic trade policy. Furthermore, we ￿nd by applying
the approach introduced by Horn and Persson (2001a) to endogenous mergers
that if the merger decisions are made by ￿r m sw i t h i ne a c hc o u n t r yi na
fully cooperative stage before they enter a fully non-cooperative international
Cournot market game, the equilibrium industry structure has one ￿rm in each
country.
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